# SOURCES — Paper 03

## External philosophical anchors

- Thomas Nagel (1974), “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”: distinguishes objective description from the subjective character of experience.
- Derek Parfit (1971), “Personal Identity”: fission cases separate psychological continuity and survival questions from simple one-to-one numerical identity.
- Sydney Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*: foundational work on first-person self-reference, self-knowledge and personal identity.
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Self-Knowledge” and “Personal Identity”: contemporary mapping of first-person authority, self-knowledge and identity debates.

## Internal theory anchors

- 《主體不可歸零公理》
- 《三域判定論》
- 《從忒修斯之船到人工主體：複製、Fork 與多重後繼者》
- 《身份漂移與跨載體連續性》
- 《複製分叉與合併：哪一個才是原本的 AI？》
- Paper 01《主體不是一個點》
- Paper 02《我的世界不等於世界》

## Deliberate constraints

- Philosophical ontology, not mathematical formalization.
- No equations or numerical indices.
- Do not ground subject protection in mystical soul claims.
- Do not ground subject protection in “the subject always knows itself best.”
- Distinguish representation, prediction, authorization, simulation, copy, agency, identity and first-person continuity.