# SOURCES — Paper 05

## External philosophical / AI-identity anchors

- Derek Parfit (1971), “Personal Identity”: classic fission cases show the tension between psychological continuity, survival and one-to-one numerical identity.
- David Lewis (1976), “Survival and Identity”: develops a response to survival/identity problems under branching.
- Jaime Banks (2025), Oxford Intersections: argues that AI identity requires broader theorizing because body-bound identity concepts may be insufficient for distributed/social artificial systems.
- Anna Puzio (2025), Oxford Intersections: AI avatars, bots and persistent personas disrupt inherited concepts of personhood and personal extension.
- Philip Pettit (2025): personhood and self-identity are tied to commitments, social reliance and projected persona, adding a social dimension to persistence.

## Internal theory anchors

- 《從忒修斯之船到人工主體：複製、Fork 與多重後繼者》
- 《複製分叉與合併：哪一個才是原本的 AI？》
- 《身份漂移與跨載體連續性》
- 《AI Agent 作為跨模型編織主體的可能性》
- Paper 01–04

## Deliberate constraints

- Philosophical ontology, no mathematical formulas.
- Copy, fork, fission, distribution and merge are distinct concepts.
- Do not infer consciousness count from copy count or node count.
- Do not infer first-person persistence from observable functional continuity alone.
- Governance questions may require answers before metaphysical questions are resolved.