# Source Map — Paper 06

## External academic anchors

- Jiang, Xi & Xie (2024): influential retired leaders can constrain incumbent autocrats through informal political clout, especially personnel networks; the effect is distinct from formal office.
- Higashijima & Shiraito (2026): tutelary power by a former autocrat does not automatically raise a successor's public support; guardianship is not universally legitimacy-enhancing.
- Oliver (2024): former democratic presidents can retain substantial rhetorical and cue-giving influence without formal governing authority, supporting the distinction between influence and sovereignty.
- Boix & Svolik (2013): effective power sharing requires real constraints, not nominal institutions.
- Ji (2026): retention of a critical military office can preserve strong informal influence even after other top portfolios are relinquished.
- Svolik (2012) and Baturo (2014): succession, power concentration, and tenure are central to authoritarian political risk.

## Internal theory dependencies

1. Paper 01 — 權力升階轉譯
2. Paper 05 — 權力可轉移性與制度承接
3. 《殘留主權與權力後效》
4. 《權力交還與可逆主權》
5. 《主權恢復與逆向通道遷移》
6. 《表象主權與通道主權》
7. 《可逆主權與民主閉合》
8. 《開源獨裁者猜想》

## New increment in Paper 06

Paper 06 distinguishes:
- office exit,
- channel exit,
- revocation exit,
- network persistence,
- reputational authority,
- tutelary guardianship,
- dual sovereignty,
- ghost institutional stock.

It introduces:
- post-office power vector $\mathbf{X}_r$,
- successor disobedience cost $C_s^D$,
- personnel control ratio $q_H$,
- self-reactivation ability $R_r^{\mathrm{self}}$,
- special non-refusability $NR_r$,
- residual sovereignty index $RSI_r$,
- post-exit cycle test.

Core relation:

$$
\text{真正的放權}
=
\text{後任有能力合法地不聽前任}.
$$