# Source Map — Paper 03

## External academic anchors

- Reuter & Gandhi (2011): economic performance and elite defection from hegemonic parties.
- Hollyer, Rosendorff & Vreeland (2015): public information can coordinate higher-order beliefs and mobilization under autocracy.
- Reuter & Szakonyi (2019): elite cohesion, defection, personal followings, business connections and independent political capacity.
- Shadmehr & Bernhardt (2011): collective action, public signals and strategic uncertainty.
- Riedl et al. (2020): strategic conditions for authoritarian-led democratization.
- del Río (2022): elite defection rises with strategic opportunity, economic downturns and weaker media control.
- Hassan (2024): public coordination can improve mobilization while simultaneously making actors legible to repression.
- del Río & Higashijima (2025): elite divisions can produce liberalization or repression depending on regime structure and security responses.
- Liu et al. (2026): leader agency contributes materially to variation in regime change.

## Internal theory dependencies

1. 《如果是一個國家：放權何以成為高報酬策略》
2. 《如果是一個國家：政治帳本如何生成》
3. 《主權核與控制聯盟》
4. 《政治關係動力學的綜合框架》
5. 《開源獨裁者猜想》
6. 《可逆主權與民主閉合》
7. 《有一個國家說：一黨制保護所有人的利益》

## New increment in Paper 03

Paper 03 separates:
- private diagnosis,
- latent reform preference,
- public signaling,
- mutual recognition,
- common knowledge,
- elite defection,
- alternative coalition formation,
- governing substitutability.

Core relations:

$$
R_{\mathrm{visible}}\downarrow
\not\Rightarrow
R_{\mathrm{latent}}\downarrow
$$

and:

$$
\text{shared diagnosis}
\neq
\text{governable alternative coalition}.
$$