# Source Map — Paper 02

## External academic anchors

- Healy & Malhotra (2013): retrospective evaluation of government performance.
- De Vries & Solaz (2017): information acquisition, blame attribution, behavioral response as separable stages.
- Ashworth (2012): political accountability and voter inference about incumbent type.
- Hellwig & Samuels (2008): institutional structure affects clarity of responsibility.
- Liu (2022): power personalization, credit claiming and blame minimization.
- Gill (2026): rules and movement between personalist and collective leadership structures.
- Radtke (2020): post-tenure fate affects leader incentives, especially under personalist rule.
- Riedl et al. (2020): authoritarian-led democratization and strategic transition conditions.
- Acemoglu & Robinson (2008): formal institutional change and persistence of de facto elite power.

## Internal theory dependencies

1. 《如果是一個國家：放權何以成為高報酬策略》
2. 《表象主權與通道主權》
3. 《主權核與控制聯盟》
4. 《政治關係動力學的綜合框架》
5. 《有一個國家說：一黨制保護所有人的利益》
6. 《開源獨裁者猜想》
7. 《可逆主權與民主閉合》

## New increment in Paper 02

Paper 02 separates:
- objective governance failure,
- effective visibility,
- responsibility attribution,
- common knowledge of attribution,
- successor differentiation,
- repair capacity,
- political ledger convertibility.

The key new relation is:

$$
\text{Governance Cost}
\neq
\text{Redeemable Political Ledger}.
$$

and:

$$
-\mathcal{B}_t
\rightarrow
+\phi_j\mathcal{B}_t
$$

for a credible successor under restricted conditions.