# Source Map — Paper 04

## External academic anchors

- Endogenous State Capacity: state capacity has multiple dimensions and is shaped by elite conflict and political incentives.
- Ways out of Authoritarianism (Oxford Handbook, 2025): authoritarian exits can be regular or irregular; regular transitions more often support democratization, while violent/irregular collapse can lead to new autocracy or state failure.
- Elite Change without Regime Change: crises can induce elite-coalition reconfiguration that preserves authoritarian rule rather than ending it.
- Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: autocratic leader exit can produce democracy, regime persistence, or a new autocracy.
- Regime Change Cascades: focal points, lame-duck leadership, elite coordination and structural preconditions affect cascades; cascades do not necessarily yield democracy.
- Critical Junctures literature: institutional change is concentrated in bounded periods with heightened contingency and coalition-building.
- Preconditions for Pacted Transitions: major political crises can open negotiated transitions when elites-in-power and opposition have bargaining counterparts.
- Authoritarian-Led Democratization: low transition risk and incumbent organizational strength can make top-down transition strategically rational.

## Internal theory dependencies

1. Paper 01 — 權力升階轉譯
2. Paper 02 — 政治帳本
3. Paper 03 — 潛在改革菁英與替代聯盟
4. 《主權核與控制聯盟》
5. 《可逆主權與民主閉合》
6. 《政治關係動力學的綜合框架》

## New increment in Paper 04

Paper 04 introduces:
- lower reform threshold $B_R$,
- collapse threshold $B_C$,
- state-capacity survival floor $S_{\min}$,
- transferable state capacity $S^T$,
- reform-window strength $W_R(t)$,
- authoritarian-adaptation window $W_A(t)$,
- timing race $\tau_R$ vs. $\tau_A$,
- hysteresis,
- multi-scale time structure,
- competing-risk outcomes.

Core relation:

$$
\text{Reform Window}
\neq
\text{Reform Outcome}.
$$