# Source Map — Paper 05

## External academic anchors

- Boix & Svolik (2013): authoritarian institutions can alleviate commitment and monitoring problems in ruler–elite power sharing; their constraint weakens when the balance of power becomes too unequal.
- Ma (2016): credible term limits and succession expectations can institutionalize intergenerational authoritarian power sharing and enable elites to monitor violations.
- Zeng (2018): collective decision institutions can constrain unchecked patronage in personnel appointments even when the top leader remains preeminent.
- Gandhi & Sumner (2020): leader survival is compatible with either balanced elite power or consolidation; concentration must be measured through personnel and institutional behavior rather than tenure alone.
- Paine (2022): power sharing is strategic and affects both commitment credibility and challenger capability.
- Kokkonen & Møller (2026): succession bargaining may generate short-term concessions, but durable institutions require incentives that make power sharing persist beyond one succession event.

## Internal theory dependencies

1. Paper 01 — 權力升階轉譯
2. Paper 02 — 政治帳本
3. Paper 03 — 潛在改革菁英與替代聯盟
4. Paper 04 — 改革窗口
5. 《主權核與控制聯盟》
6. 《表象主權與通道主權》
7. 《開源獨裁者猜想》
8. 《可逆主權與民主閉合》

## New increment in Paper 05

Paper 05 moves from:
- power sharing
to:
- power transferability.

It introduces:
- personal dependence $D_j^P$,
- personal concentration $PC$,
- collective executability $\Gamma_C$,
- multi-key sovereignty,
- time-structured power sharing,
- succession stress test $SST$,
- institutional memory $M_I$,
- power transferability index $PTI$,
- removal impact score $RIS_r$,
- institutional continuity index $ICI$.

Core proposition:

$$
\text{真正的去個人化}
=
\text{國家功能不再只能透過某一個人存在}.
$$